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a  b  s t  r a  c t
Energy  policy  research  has  highlighted systematic  shortfalls  in the  adoption  of new energy technologies
owing  to  market  failures and  behavioral  factors. However,  less research  has  examined  how organizational
processes may  block  energy  innovations. In  this  paper, we propose that a key organizational  obstacle  in
the  adoption  of innovations  may  be  the  lack of a  good justification  for  implementing  a technology.  In  situ-
ations where  there is no obviously  correct  answer  regarding the  adoption  of an innovation,  organizations
put  a  premium on developing a justification  that  may  be  favorably  received  in the  context  of  an  organi-
zation’s  energy culture.  Absent  a  favorable  justification  an  organization may  abandon a new technology,
or  delay  implementing  it until a  suitable  justification  becomes available.  We draw  our insights  about  the
role of justifications  in organizations from  a study  of the  U.S.  Navy’s  decade-long  attempt to justify  LED
lighting on  its ships.  LED lighting proponents  in the  Navy  cycled  through  several  justifications for  the
technology  with little  success.  We conclude  that  a better  appreciation  of the  organizational  processes
involved in justifying  new energy investments  is essential  for  the  development  of  more  effective  energy
policy.
Published by  Elsevier  Ltd.
1. Introduction
Many energy efficiency initiatives involve the adoption of some-
thing new, whether they are new behaviors and practices or new
technologies and infrastructures. Much policy research has focused
on the upstream development of new technologies perhaps implic-
itly assuming that free market processes and self-interest would
drive subsequent adoption processes. However, adoption rates for
new energy technologies have persistently lagged behind the pre-
dictions that cost-benefit analyses would suggest [1]. This has
led researchers to focus on behavioral failures as one source of
the shortfalls in  investments in  energy innovations [2–5].  While
there has been important progress in  understanding behavioral
factors, significant gaps remain in our knowledge of barriers to
the adoption of new energy technologies. One important gap is
the organizational decision processes involved in  the adoption of
energy innovations, a topic on which scholars have recently called
for more research [6].
∗ Corresponding author.
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The purpose of this paper is to take up the question, ‘How
do  complex organizations make decisions about adopting energy
innovations?’ Influential parts of the literature still treat household
and organizational decision-making about energy technologies as
profit-maximizing cost-benefit calculi that, in principle, are  highly
prescriptive. However, for decades scholars have criticized the
tendency to black-box organizational decision-making as an opti-
mizing activity, indicating that this is descriptively inaccurate and
may  mislead policy making by creating flawed expectations regard-
ing organizations’ reaction to policy interventions [7].  Instead,
scholars stress that, because of the inherent uncertainties involved
in  adopting innovations, organizational decisions about innova-
tions are not at all straightforward [8].  Thus, in a comprehensive
review of energy scholarship, Sovacool [9] calls for research that
transcend “conventional techno-economic thinking” [10] to rein-
state human decision making in  its full social setting into studies
of energy use. Specifically, Sovacool appeals for research that
addresses the role of communication and culture in decisions about
energy use, noting both the need to investigate what types of  infor-
mation influence energy users and how a group’s cultural views and
values influence its decisions about energy use.
To shed light on these questions, we  analyze a particularly illu-
minating case: the U.S. Navy’s attempts at adopting LED lamps on
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.02.009
2214-6296/Published by Elsevier Ltd.
58 N. Dew et al. / Energy Research & Social Science 27 (2017) 57–67
its ships [11]. The Navy started researching LED lamps in 2002.
Yet, despite continuous effort by elements of the Navy that sup-
ported the adoption of this technology, as of 2015 approximately
90% of the total fleet lighting needs were still met  by less-efficient
incandescent and fluorescent lighting systems [12].  Given some
inherent technical, safety and efficiency advantages of LED lighting,
one might have reasonably expected it to be used more extensively
than it is. Instead, the LED lighting case illustrates the obstacle
course organizations may  have to conquer in order to  adopt a new
technology.
Our study makes two contributions. First, our case research on
the U.S. Navy provides an example of the justification phenomenon
in organizations. Yin [13] argues that the identification of hith-
erto overlooked phenomena is one of the chief roles and strengths
of case study research. We speculate that the phenomenon of
justifications may  have been ignored because it stands outside
the boundaries of the techno-economic paradigm that dominates
energy studies. The case of the U.S. Navy clarifies this concept. Sec-
ond, we expect that the concept of justifications may  be generally
applicable across the organizational landscape because the social
psychological theories upon which justification is  based generalize
to a wide range of organizations. These theories suggest that social
accountability plays an important role in  organizational decision
making. Suitable justifications for choices therefore matter even
more in organizations than they do for private choices [14,15].
Thus, we speculate that our  analysis of justifications in the U.S.
Navy may  be relevant across a  wide variety of organizational types,
nationalities and situations.
We  proceed as follows. In Section 2 we  provide a  condensed
review of some previous literature that forms essential background
for our study. Section 3 describes our research methods and pro-
vides background on technology adoption in  the U.S. Navy. Section
4 narrates the four separate ways the Navy attempted to justify
LED lighting adoption. In Section 5 we discuss our analysis and
present results. In this section we also explain why  previous lit-
erature does not adequately account for our  findings (Section 5.3).
Section 6 concludes by considering the implications of this study
for policy debates.
2. Literature review
We  take recent literature on energy cultures as the backdrop for
our study [6]. This literature highlights the large number of factors
that researchers have identified as affecting energy behaviors, such
as microeconomic theory and behavioral economics. The energy
cultures framework is  particularly suited to our study because it
was developed out of a  desire to identify levers of change in energy
systems [18]. Picking up a  significant recent theme in  the energy
literature, it emphasizes that no single analytical approach tends
to explain more than a small portion of energy behaviors or holds
a monopoly on reliable policy interventions [19,9].  Instead, the
framework suggests that it is  important to  consider the overall sys-
tem in which difficult decisions about energy are embedded and
produced. It posits three major groups of elements in  energy sys-
tems: norms, practices and material culture. The energy culture of
a specific household, organization or nation is  defined as emerging
from the interactions between these  three elements [6].  The frame-
work proposes that the components of an organizational energy
culture may  lock-in to an equilibrium arrangement, thus creating
systematic barriers to adopting different energy behaviors. Chang-
ing the system equilibrium may  require an external shock [20] or
the diffusion of niche-internal factors that change the equilibrium
from within [21].
In this paper, we  build on the energy cultures framework by
proposing that organizations search for suitable justifications for
changing their energy behaviors. A justification is  a  defense or
explanation of a particular course of action. It  provides a  ratio-
nale that seeks to satisfy oneself and probing from others about
“Why am I (or why  are  we)  doing this?” A  significant body of
research in  decision theory has studied ways that individuals and
groups make choices by constructing reasons that justify decisions
both to themselves and to others [22,14,72].  Typically, in making
choices individuals attempt to find a  dominant option by framing
and reframing an issue until an ascendant option is  revealed. If they
cannot find a  dominant option, then they grudgingly engage in the
more cognitively taxing process of considering trade-offs between
alternatives in order to find a way  of justifying one choice over
another.
Scholars have argued that these reason-based decision-making
processes are important to individuals but may  be intensified in
organizational settings because in  these settings individuals owe
justification to one another [23,15]. In order to maintain their social
standing and not  appear foolish in front of their audience, actors
become even more conscious of the need to  give persuasive justifi-
cations for why they propose one choice over another. Thus, owing
to  social dynamics, actors pay heightened attention to justifying
choices by grounding them firmly in a convincing logic. Where pos-
sible, actors favor justifications that are easy to make to others,
simple to describe, and noncontroversial [15].
Prior research has identified justifications as a key element in
innovation adoption in  organizations [24].  Why is this? Though
often overlooked in techno-economic thinking, new ideas typi-
cally need  the support of multiple organizational constituents to
be adopted. It is well established in the organizations literature
that only with support are new ideas able to overcome lock-in
to  the prevailing culture of an organization [25–28]. Thus, while
the literature recognizes that innovation ideation is typically pro-
moted by personal and small group factors, innovation adoption in
organizations is influenced largely by socio-political factors such as
participation in  decision-making and the backing of organizational
constituents. Kanter summarizes that, “The features of  successful
ideas have  more to do  with the likelihood of gathering political sup-
port than with the likelihood of the idea to  produce results.(̈[29];
p.186; quoted in [26]; p.1105).
In  this organizational context, the process of adopting innova-
tions is open to  socio-political maneuvers focused on mobilizing
sponsorship. Advocates and champions of innovations work to
establish a coalition of constituents that are willing to make the nec-
essary investments of attention, enthusiasm and social and political
capital that  are needed in order to see an idea through to adop-
tion. Before making these investments, constituents need to  be
convinced that undertaking such efforts is  justified [24].  Therefore
advocates of innovations attempt to provide satisfying justifica-
tions for constituents.
The literature also provides some specific pointers to  the nature
of these justifications. Decision-making processes based on  justifi-
cations deviate significantly from normative choice models. Even
more than individuals, groups exhibit strong preferences for escap-
ing debates about trade-offs because conflicting reasons are hard
to evaluate and reconcile (Irwin & Davis, 1995). In some instances,
dominance derives from prominent features of a  choice. For exam-
ple, Barber et al. [14]  found that stock-picking clubs more strongly
favored firms on Fortune’s ‘most admired’ list than individuals
making the same choice. The researchers proposed that this phe-
nomenon occurred because clubs were more likely to  pick stocks
that were easy to justify to members. Relevance is  another way
advocates attempt to justify a proposed choice. Studies of issue-
selling in organizations have found that  issue sellers work hard to
establish relevance by making linkages between their focal issue
and other issues that their organization cares about [30].  In the
absence of a dominant justification, actors resort to tallying rea-
N. Dew et al. / Energy Research & Social Science 27 (2017) 57–67 59
sons for a choice. Because trading-off alternatives is so challenging,
individuals may  instead simply count the number of reasons for one
choice versus another. For example, organizations include financial
analyses in their choices but also may  admit a  list of other objective
and subjective variables (e.g. “strategic” rationales, gut feel) to form
a justification. Finally, if a  satisfactory decision is  not forthcoming,
decision makers may  keep adding elements to  the tally or  simply
delay deciding until a  suitable justification becomes available [31].
A final important insight from prior literature is  that, in organi-
zational settings, we  should expect justifications to be contested,
sometimes highly so [32].  This will be the case for choices that
involve significant uncertainty, for which there is  no obviously right
answer [33,28],  or for choices that are politically charged [34]. For
example, modeling techniques such as cost-benefit analysis, are
known to be highly susceptible to assumptions by modelers and
may  become a  contested aspect of the justification process [35].
The energy cultures framework provides a  useful guide regarding
how contests about justifications may  unfold. Organizational actors
search for “good” justifications that are acceptable to each other, to
stakeholders and to authorities [14]. Therefore, what amounts to
“good” is context specific: a  justification’s reception may  depend
on the energy culture of the particular organization considering an
adoption proposal [8,18].
3. Research approach and methods
This paper is  based on a multi-year study using an embedded
case analysis [13]. The focus of this study is  the adoption of ship-
board LED lighting by  the U.S. Navy, an ideal candidate for a study
like ours for several reasons. The Navy has a very mixed record of
innovation adoption. At  times it has been a venturesome adopter
of cutting edge technology [33]. The Navy’s development of aircraft
carriers and pioneering naval aviation is a  classic example of this.
Particularly relevant are the energy-related technologies that have
been, or currently are, part of the Navy’s repertoire. In the 1950s
the Navy pioneered nuclear power, leading to spillover effects that
influenced the technology trajectory taken by the civilian nuclear
energy sector for many decades [36]. The Navy today uses nuclear
power in all submarines and aircraft carriers and this is  thought
to generate significant tactical advantages. Currently, the Navy is
pioneering the deployment of shipboard rail guns and high-energy
lasers, both of which have significant onboard energy demands.
However, the Navy is  also notorious for sometimes rejecting
promising innovations. The initial denial of the potential of con-
tinuous aim firing is an often-cited example [37]. In 1900 U.S.
Navy Lieutenant William Sims observed a  gunnery practice on a
British ship that greatly improved accuracy and nearly quadrupled
the  rate of fire. Sims wrote and sent thirteen reports, which were
endorsed by captains and one Admiral, to the Bureau of Ordnance.
Despite the endorsed reports, the bureau did not believe the prac-
tice could achieve results and decided to  conduct its own  (flawed)
tests, which concluded that the practice was impossible. Continu-
ous aim firing was eventually adopted, after significant delay, only
after Sims wrote a  letter directly to  President Theodore Roosevelt.
The Navy’s mixed record raises the question of why the Navy some-
times adopts innovations and sometimes does not.
We were drawn to  the Navy’s attempted adoption of LED light-
ing since this is  a case for which the Navy’s organizational processes
are relatively observable [38].  The case provides a  rich opportu-
nity to study the factors that actually seem to matter among the
community of practitioners involved in  the Navy’s decisions to
adopt a new energy technology. Data for our study was drawn
from multiple sources. We conducted interviews with U.S. Navy
and Marine Corps representatives in various specialties (e.g., engi-
neering, energy, etc.), consultants and researchers working for the
Table 1
Timeline of U.S. Navy LED lighting program
1997 Navy’s Affordability Through Commonality report discusses LED
technology but dismisses it due to insufficient power
2001 Defense Science Board (DSB) task force cites need to  use
technologies to  reduce hotel loads (e.g. energy use from
lighting) on  ships but only mentions fluorescent lamps
2002 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) initiates
the High Efficiency Distributed Lighting (HEDlight) program
2004 Navy conducts time-and-motion study on lamp replacement
on  aircraft carrier USS George Washington
2007 First LED lighting trialed on Navy ships
2008 DSB report More Fight, Less Fuel encourages DoD investments
in energy efficient technologies
Approval of the MIL-DTL-16377 supplement specification for
solid state lighting by NAVSEA
2009 Secretary of the Navy Ray Maybus launches the GGF (Great
Green  Fleet initiative)
Marine Corps establishes Expeditionary Energy Office
2011  Office of Naval Research (ONR) TechSolutions installs 33 LED
fixtures experimentally on submarine USS New Hampshire
(SSN 778)
2011 NAVSEA studies maintenance burden of lighting in DDG  fleet
2013 NAVSEA awards $23M contract to  Energy Focus to design,
qualify and supply the U.S. Navy with drop-in LED lighting
tubes
National Shipbuilders Research Program (NSRP) and the Navy
fund research in next generation LED lighting fixtures for ships
2014 NAVSEA undertakes fleet-wide study of LED lighting based on
energy efficiency benefits
Some LED lighting installed on  126 Navy ships (of approx. 270
ship  fleet)
2015 Some LED lighting installed on  170 Navy ships
90%  of total Navy ship lighting needs still met  by incandescent
and  fluorescent lighting systems
Navy, and personnel representing LED vendors. We recorded and
transcribed some interviews and took detailed, handwritten notes
of others. We  also gathered information by email exchanges with
interviewees. A second data source was original documents, some
only available to Navy personnel, such as internal analyses con-
ducted by Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), the engineering
arm of the Navy, and presentations made by senior Navy officials.
We also drew on reports and analyses of Navy energy saving ini-
tiatives appearing in  sources such as the Office of Naval Research
Currents magazine and website. Our analysis also drew extensively
on four theses completed by students at the Naval Postgraduate
School, including spreadsheet models that provide detailed finan-
cial analyses of LED lighting costs and benefits. Lastly, we drew on
generally available public domain data on energy initiatives under-
taken by the Navy and Marine Corps. These included news reports,
Congressional Research Service and Government Accountability
Office reports, Navy and Marine Corps energy strategy documents,
congressional testimonies (including video material), and news
releases by the Navy’s LED vendors.
Our analysis was  inductive and iterative. As part of our research
process, we reviewed the data and created a  timeline of  the Navy’s
attempts to adopt LED lighting (see Table 1) from which we identi-
fied key events in  the history of LED lighting in the Navy. Through
this initial investigation, we noted four different justifications for
adopting LED lighting. We then treated each justification as a sepa-
rate case and adopted a  comparative case study design for rigor ([9];
p.13). We identified evidence for elements of each case and evalu-
ated the merits of the different justifications. Finally, we  compared
across the cases to assess their similarities and differences. In accor-
dance with our  inductive method, we did not approach our analysis
with specific hypotheses, although our  analysis was  informed by
our knowledge of prior research (see literature reviewed in  Section
2 and alternative explanations for the data considered in Section
5.3).
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4. Many attempts to justify shipboard LED lighting
Our analysis revealed four primary justifications for the use
of shipboard LED lighting: (1) it supports the Great Green Fleet
(GGF) initiative, (2) it reduces maintenance burden, (3) it provides
greater combat effectiveness, or (4) it increases energy efficiency.
Our assessment of the merits of the claims and evidence of each jus-
tification shows that none of these justifications were sufficient to
garner significant, widespread support within the Navy and among
the Navy’s stakeholders, and this limited the rate of adoption of LED
lighting on Navy ships.
4.1. Better strategy: justifying LED lighting as part of the Great
Green Fleet (GGF)
LED lighting is currently budgeted as a “Navy operational energy
initiative” under the category of “maritime quick wins.” It  was
part of a $1.9 billion package of energy-related appropriations
for the 2013–2017 period aimed at increasing energy efficiency
and thereby reducing the Navy’s fuel consumption afloat by 15%
by 2020 ([39]; p. 19) .  Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus cham-
pioned these initiatives as part of the GGF initiative launched in
2009. A former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Mabus claimed
the initiative was important to reduce the Navy’s dependence
on oil—particularly foreign oil—thus invoking a strategic logic for
going green [11,39].  Principally, this initiative called for adopting
biofuels in Navy ships and aircraft and lowering the Navy’s energy
consumption. Mabus set a  goal for the Navy to showcase an aircraft
carrier strike group running on biofuel blends in 2012, to deploy a
carrier strike group running on biofuel blends in 2016, and to  get
50% of its fuel and power from alternative energy sources by 2020.
This brings us to the first justification for buying LED lamps for
Navy ships: LED lighting supports the Navy’s GGF initiative. The key
claim of the GGF justification is that adoption of energy-efficient
technologies, such as shipboard LED lighting, would strengthen
the Navy’s strategic position by lowering energy consumption and
dependence. The justification for LED lighting was therefore pack-
aged into the GGF initiative.
However, during the three years following the announcement of
the GGF, the initiative met  criticism from all sides, including from
some of the Navy’s otherwise most ardent supporters in  the U.S.
Congress. Senator John McCain remarked that the Navy’s green
agenda was “a terrible misplacement of priorities” [40].  Republi-
cans in particular were opposed to the idea of the Navy going green
since many were publically skeptical of climate change. Later, Sec-
retary Mabus found himself not only on the wrong side of Congress
but also on the wrong side of a rapid expansion in domestic U.S.
shale oil production, which served to further undermine the argu-
ment that oil was a strategic priority for the Navy.
In early 2016, when the GGF sailed on a seven-month deploy-
ment, it did so to less-enthusiastic reactions than Navy officials had
hoped for. Reuters led its coverage with the title, “Amidst Drop in
Oil Prices, U.S. Navy Deploys ‘Great Green Fleet,” [41].  Quoting one
observer, the article highlighted that “the initiative is  as much about
environmental symbolism as cost savings or tactical advantage.”
The example of the GGF highlights that energy innovations may
fail to be adopted when the justifications for them do not  resonate
with an organization’s energy culture. Packaging LED lighting into
the broader GGF justification tied LED lighting to the fate of the
GGF. However, the GGF initiative encountered significant ideologi-
cal resistance. It  was not  a  politically neutral issue inside or  outside
of the Navy. It created a  cultural backlash within the Navy (where it
appeared to lack support) and a  political backlash among many of
the Navy’s key stakeholders in Congress. According to Shachtman
[40], “Even within the Pentagon, doubts about the program crept
in. Top Defense Department officials, ordinarily supportive of green
tech efforts, rolled their eyes when I asked about the Navy’s biofuel
push.” Individuals who serve in  the U.S. military are overwhelm-
ingly politically conservative. The Navy’s experience is consistent
with research that indicated that politically conservative individ-
uals are more likely to buy an energy efficient technology if it is
unlabeled than if it bears a pro-environmental label [42].  In effect,
the GGF justification for LED lighting was  sunk before it ever sailed.
The timing of the GGF deployment during a  large drop in oil  prices
in early 2016, only made matters worse since it made biofuels
uneconomic. However, the preponderance of the data suggests that
observers’ subjective impressions of the GGF were dominated (neg-
atively) by the green label [43].  If the Navy was  to adopt LEDs, the
organization needed to  find a  different way of justifying it.
4.2. Less labor: justifying LED  lighting based on reduction of
maintenance burden
When looking back on the history of shipboard LED lighting, it is
instructive that the impetus for the initiative started with NAVSEA,
the Navy’s engineering arm. To a  NAVSEA engineer, lighting is a
maintenance problem, not  an energy problem. NAVSEA considered
lighting to  be one of the top 10 maintenance issues in  the fleet. Gen-
eral overhead lighting needed to be replaced at least once annually,
and the berth lights found in  sleeping areas were regarded as a “leg-
endary” maintenance problem that required attention every other
month [44].  Maintaining these lighting systems requires labor.
Recent reports note that the usable lifetime of the Navy’s most com-
mon  type of lamp (T12 general lighting tubes) is  six to  eight months,
well below its rated 12-month lifetime [45].  This intensified the
maintenance burden of fluorescent or incandescent lighting sys-
tems. By comparison, LED lamps approved by the Navy boasted a
50,000 h lifetime—almost six years of uninterrupted lighting. Thus,
NAVSEA justified the adoption of shipboard LED lighting systems
by claiming LEDs would lower the maintenance burden.
To understand how a  lower maintenance burden might justify
paying premium prices for MIL-SPEC LED lamps, one needs to know
why changing a  lamp on a  Navy ship is not like  changing a lamp
at home. Changing a  lamp in  one’s garage might take five min-
utes, perhaps 10 min  if the job required a  stepladder. Contrast this
with the Navy’s situation: In 2004, the Navy surveyed how  long,
on average, it took to  replace individual T12 lamps and the bal-
last (or starter) on the USS George Washington (an aircraft carrier).
The average was 86 min  each for two  people, or a  grand total of
2.84 h per lamp. A subject-matter expert at NAVSEA indicated they
used a  rule of thumb of 4.0  h to change an individual lamp [46], and
NAVSEA’s own internal analysis of LED lighting economics used a
conservative figure of 2.0 h [47].
These times may  seem somewhat shocking but they incorporate
every step the Navy requires in changing a lamp, from the time the
maintainer leaves his/her work center until he/she is ready to  start
work on the next task. These steps include the following:
• Tagging out the new lamp and tools from the storeroom; this step
alone can take an hour.
• Walking from the storeroom to the location where a  lamp needs
changing, and back again. On a 5000-person aircraft carrier, dis-
tances between locations are meaningful, so this step may also
take time.
• Changing the lamp.
• Taking the used lamp to  a designated hazardous material (HAZ-
MAT) storage location.
• Returning tools to storage.
The tagging-out and tagging-in process is  time consuming
because the Navy requires the maintainer to  find drawings of the
ship’s electrical circuits in order to identify the correct circuit break-
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ers to isolate the light fixture before work begins. Part of the caution
is to avoid the risk of electric shock, which is significant on Navy
ships. The Navy reported 65 serious shocks in  2010. In the same
year, the U.S. Coast Guard reported one death from electric shock.
Therefore, the Navy requires that maintainers print the electri-
cal circuit drawings and have them approved by  the engineering
duty officer (when the ship is docked) or engineering officer of the
watch (when the ship is at sea). Before a  lamp can be changed, an
independent, qualified signer has to check that the relevant elec-
trical circuits are correctly tagged and isolated. After the lamp is
changed, the whole process goes in reverse order. These reported
times do not include the time that maintainers spend in  train-
ing, the time that supervisors and reviewers spend directly on the
tagging-out and signing processes, or the general supervisory over-
head involved in managing a maintenance crew.
A connected maintenance problem concerns the storage of
lamps. Legacy lighting (incandescent or fluorescent) is replaced
more frequently, so there is a  much greater need for space to store
spares. Fluorescent lamps, in  particular, contain mercury, which
requires special storage and handling. Used fluorescent tubes must
be treated as HAZMAT waste, incurring additional disposal costs.
While space is  always a  constraint on Navy ships, it is at a  par-
ticular premium on submarines. LED lamps substantially alleviate
these problems because they are not  considered HAZMAT and their
long life means fewer spares are needed.
The very unique circumstances of Navy lighting were analyzed
in a project plan drawn up in  2011 by NAVSEA for the Navy’s fleet
of 57 DDGs (destroyer war ships) [47].  This document outlined the
justification for adopting 100% LED lighting on DDGs based on the
avoided maintenance burden of LEDs. A DDG has approximately
3000 light fixtures. Griggel assumed an average of 2.0 h to change a
lamp. The analysis showed the Navy could save $560,000 per year,
per ship, in manpower costs by switching to  LED lighting. At  2014
prices, the Navy might spend approximately $480,000 to equip a
DDG entirely with LED lighting—implying a payback of less than one
year. In Griggel’s analysis, 85% of the cost savings from LEDs came
from maintenance savings. The remaining 15% of savings came from
reduced fuel consumption while underway and reduced pier-side
electricity consumption.
The Navy subsequently rejected Griggel’s analysis. The details
of the Navy’s internal decision-making process related to  Griggel’s
work are not known to us but—rightly or  wrongly—the Navy’s deci-
sion was based on the rationale that personnel is fixed on Navy
ships. The Navy puts the opportunity cost of ships’ labor at zero.
As a result, reductions in lighting systems maintenance became
immaterial.
The key difference between the GGF justification for LED light-
ing and the maintenance burden justification is that the latter does
not depend on fuel savings for its rationale, thus cutting the tie
between LED lighting and energy efficiency. Instead, the NAVSEA
justification rested on the assumption of labor savings (and to a
lesser extent, other engineering-related issues, such as avoiding
the HAZMAT burden of fluorescent lighting systems). Although this
justification did resonate strongly with a  Navy engineering commu-
nity that has an important say  in  decisions the Navy makes about its
fleet, it did not have broad-based support across the Navy or among
external stakeholders. It was a  low-key initiative, of interest to  a
specific group, that did not “raise any red flags” with stakeholders.
Their responses to the justification were neutral; in fact, this jus-
tification did not engender much excitement inside or outside the
Navy.
The failure of this justification warrants additional examination.
It is highly unlikely that Navy labor has a value of zero. Labor gen-
erates costs aboard a ship: sailors have to  be fed, they need a bunk,
they have to be supervised. Simply moving a sailor off a ship and
into a role at a  Navy facility saves the Navy money. Also, the Navy’s
own long-term labor strategy (as well as that of many other navies
around the world) is aimed at crewing ships much more leanly,
which suggests that the costs (and risks) of manning are significant.
For example, the new LCS (Littoral Combat Ship) has an extremely
low manning level  relative to the legacy frigates it replaces. Further-
more, because of the long average times to change lamps on ships,
attributing even a  low opportunity cost on ships’ labor would signif-
icantly support this justification. For example, given that Griggel’s
analysis showed that LED lighting would pay for itself in less than
one year, the Navy could apply a  30% opportunity cost and still
achieve a  payback in  less than three years. Lastly, the lifetime of
Navy ships is  typically 25 years or more. While in the short run,
ships’ labor might be considered fixed, 25 years presents ample
time to  re-optimize ships’ labor utilization around less burdensome
lighting maintenance.
4.3. More fight: justifying LEDs based on combat effectiveness
Curiously absent from the GGF and manpower justifications for
the adoption of LED lighting was the idea that this new technol-
ogy could contribute to the Navy’s fighting capability [48].  A  2008
Defense Science Board task force report on  energy with the pithy
title More Fight, Less Fuel summed up the key claim of the combat
effectiveness justification for energy-efficient technologies. It cap-
tured one of the major insights that, at the time, was  emerging from
painful experiences of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: The mil-
itary had too much “tail” in proportion to its “tooth.” The Marine
Corps learned hard lessons in Iraq and in Afghanistan, where fuel
convoys that were vulnerable to  enemy ambushes and improvised
explosive device (IED) attacks represented a significant logistical
weakness. Too many Marines were dying in the defense of these
convoys. Contractor casualties—which were not counted in  the mil-
itary’s casualty numbers—were widely reported to be higher still.
In 2006, in  the midst of the fight in  Iraq and Afghanistan, Marine
General Jim Mattis urged researchers to help “unleash us from the
tether of fuel.” [49].
This situation prompted the Marine Corps to establish an Expe-
ditionary Energy Office (E2O) in 2009 to  initiate a  program of
energy-efficiency measures, including new equipment (e.g., LED
lighting, insulated tents, high-efficiency generators) and behavioral
changes (e.g., reduced idling of vehicles) that would significantly
reduce the energy needs of forward deployed Marine units. The
Corps found a  particularly eloquent spokesman in the form of
Colonel Jim Caley, who repeatedly emphasized that the E2O’s mis-
sion wasn’t about saving money and was ‘definitely not about
green’ [50].  Instead, he insisted, the right justification for new
energy technologies was  increasing mission effectiveness and sav-
ing lives.
These emerging lessons were generally applicable as the Navy
considered its future role in the Pacific, particularly regarding the
containment of China. As  the world’s largest ocean, the Pacific
meant long supply lines vulnerable to the tether of fuel −  and there-
fore disruption by an adversary. After the Pacific pivot was  made
formal in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and then in  the 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review, the door was  opened for justifying
Navy new technologies on the basis of increasing the fleet’s capa-
bilities to  sail further and loiter longer on the same amount of fuel.
This would reduce the vulnerabilities associated with a  long logis-
tical tail needed to  support operations in  the Pacific, which were
expected to  become 60% of Navy deployments by 2020.
The potential for increased warfighting capability appealed to
both the Navy and Capitol Hill. Hence, proponents of  Navy energy
initiatives had an incentive to  justify their initiatives with claims
of improvements in warfighting capability. But, there was no sim-
ple and direct link between LED lighting and fighting capability
[30,51].  Instead, the link was  indirect, relying on the logic that LEDs
62 N. Dew et al. / Energy Research & Social Science 27 (2017) 57–67
were more energy efficient, therefore a  ship with LED lights would
use less fuel, which in  principle would allow it to steam farther.
This multi-step logic was not only tenuous, but also conflicted with
the Navy’s energy culture that, like the rest of the Department of
Defense, “considers energy cheap and abundant” ([52]; p. 21). A
skeptical Navy bureaucracy required strong proof that a  new energy
technology was not  an unjustified distraction.
There are three other elements in the combat effectiveness justi-
fication for LED lighting that Navy officials might have considered,
but all are weak. First, LED lighting has an advantage over fluo-
rescent lighting systems in some niche applications, for example,
operations that required a low noise  signature. Submarines, in
particular, rely on their quiet operations for stealthiness. In this
application, LED lighting would eliminate the audible hum of fluo-
rescent lamps, thus providing an advantage. Second, Navy officials
have alluded that by  reducing the electricity load, LED lighting
would free electricity capacity onboard that might be useful for
future upgrades to radar systems or for lasers or rail guns. However,
given the spare electricity-generating capacity already observed
on many Navy ships, it might be unrealistic to expect significantly
lower costs or increased operational range. Lastly, a  case could be
made that LEDs improved the quality of lighting on ships and that
this would lead to performance improvements from the crew. How-
ever, there is no evidence that the Navy ever seriously pursued this
line of argument, instead labeling this as an “intangible benefit”
[53].  All these issues failed to  justify the lighting opportunity for
the Navy. So, LED proponents within the Navy were left once again
without a good justification for LED lighting.
4.4. Less fuel: justifying LED lighting based on energy efficiency
The key claim of the energy efficiency justification for LED light-
ing is that LEDs are more efficient than fluorescent or incandescent
lighting. Adoption of LEDs would thus reduce the Navy’s fuel use
and therefore its energy expenses.
The use of the energy efficiency justification is observed in sev-
eral sources. Secretary of the Navy Mabus stated that LED lighting
reduces the overall energy use on a  Navy ship by  2–3% [54]. The
Navy’s main LED lighting supplier, Energy Focus, has frequently
mentioned the potential energy efficiencies from using its prod-
ucts in its press releases, claiming that the Navy would save $150
million from fuel savings by  using its LEDs fleetwide [55]. Fuel sav-
ings from energy efficiency were analyzed in multiple theses at the
Naval Postgraduate School, including Cizek [56],  Bowers et al. [57],
and Brooks and Tribble [45]. Bowers et al. found that by using com-
mercial LED lighting aboard the hospital ship USS Comfort,  the Navy
could save $6 million over three years. A 2012 Coast Guard report
based on a financial model to recommend LED lighting for all new
vessels and retrofit programs [58].  The Congressional Research Ser-
vice  reported that LED lighting was among a  bundle of quick-win
technologies that Navy analysis indicated would “achieve payback
periods of less than 2 years, and returns on investment ranging from
3:1 to 45:1.” ([59]; p. 19). These reports typically note that, because
Navy ships have to make their own electricity when at sea, genera-
tion costs are several hundred percent higher at sea than on shore
[59,60]. Intuitively, this last point strengthens the energy efficiency
justification for LED lighting because it is  based on the trade-off
between the cost of deploying the more efficient technology and
the energy savings achieved by  using it.
Subsequent to the NAVSEA business case by  Griggel [47],
NAVSEA engineers undertook further analysis of the benefits of
reduced fuel consumption from shipboard LED lighting. Legler [61]
found a 2.4-year payback for incorporating LED lighting on new
build vessels, and a  six-year payback for retrofitting existing ves-
sels. The analysis considered the entire conventionally powered
(i.e. non-nuclear) fleet of the Navy. It  was deliberately conserva-
tive, omitting maintenance savings, the energy savings from lower
air conditioning usage (incandescent lighting generates significant
heat) and the benefits of lower weight from LED lighting on new
build vessels.
Although the analysis of defense energy issues [11,48,62] sup-
ports the energy efficiency justification for shipboard LED lighting,
projecting the costs and benefits is  significantly more complicated
than intuition might suggest. As explained later in this section, the
LED lights the Navy uses are considerably costlier than commercial
LED alternatives. But the costs of electricity are also much higher
for Navy vessels. Both factors significantly affect the economics of
LED lighting on Navy ships.
To  demonstrate the cost of replacing legacy lighting with LED
lighting, we use the example of the 24-inch T12 fluorescent tubes,
which are the most common legacy lamps in  the Navy, with approx-
imately 1.2 million in service. On  a  DDG-51 destroyer, 58% of all
light fixtures are T12s. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) pro-
cures and distributes replacement lamps for the Navy. In 2014, the
DLA procured T12 lamps (32  W) rated at 9000 h for $0.93 per lamp.
It  issued these lamps for $1.33 each, with a  mark-up of $0.40 per
lamp to cover its costs. It  procured drop-in LED replacement lamps
(11 W) rated at 50,000 h  for $158.85 per unit and issued these lamps
for $230.17 with a mark-up of $71.32 per lamp [45]. As issued by
the DLA, this meant that in 2014, a  replacement LED lamp was  a
staggering 173 times more expensive than a standard T12, for a
lamp that lasts 5.6  times as long.
It is important to understand why  the Navy’s LED replacement
lamps are so much more costly than commercial lamps. One rea-
son is  that the Navy has only two  qualified suppliers of T12 LED
lamps because few LED suppliers can meet the Navy’s technical
standards for lamps, which reflect the Navy’s requirement for a
drop-in replacement lamp that will survive the inherent stresses
and dangers of naval operations. For example, the Navy requires
LED lamps to  pass a stringent electromagnetic interference test
that necessitates innovative manufacturing methods. Making an
electrical appliance that passes these tests is  inherently challeng-
ing, thus adding significant cost to the lamp [63].  Separately, the
Navy also has tough standards for its lighting fixtures which must
survive being hit nine times from various angles and heights with a
400 lb hammer without denting, cracking, or chipping, and remain-
ing  fully functional [64].  NAVSEA dictates technical standards for all
Navy equipment and can veto proposals to  put any new technology
on a Navy ship.
Besides the high cost of LED lighting as compared to  legacy
lamps, the energy efficiency justification for LEDs also depends on
the cost of energy on Navy ships. Of approximately 270 ships cur-
rently in  the Navy, 82 are nuclear powered, including 10 aircraft
carriers (CVNs) with the most lighting needs in the Navy (there
are over 80,000 lighting fixtures on a CVN). The balance of the
Navy’s ships are powered with the Navy’s version of marine gas
oil. Any of these vessels may  be docked or  at sea, and these charac-
teristics influence the cost of energy. When not underway, vessels
use pier-side electricity. They would be  undergoing maintenance
or the crews would be in training. Pier-side electricity costs depend
on the homeport of each vessel, with electricity prices on the U.S.
West Coast significantly higher than those on the East Coast [65].
LED lighting was  expected to provide savings from lower pier-side
electricity bills as well as from lower fuel usage when underway.
A key issue for the energy efficiency justification is  that the
energy cost factors described above imply that the economics of
LED lighting differs on a  ship-by-ship basis. While NAVSEA did a
fleet-wide assessment [61] and approved LED lighting for all new
build vessels in 2014, individual commanding officers and chief
engineers decide on a ship-by-ship basis whether they intend to
retrofit existing ships with LED lighting. In the absence of  a  com-
pelling strategic or operational justification for retrofitting LED
N. Dew et al. / Energy Research & Social Science 27 (2017) 57–67 63
lighting, ship-by-ship adoption decisions may  depend on the recep-
tion that the energy efficiency justification gets from a  particular
ship’s commander or command staff. This may  be contingent on the
energy culture of a particular ship. At this point in  time it remains
to be seen whether these factors will be obstacles to – or  support-
ing elements for – swiftly retrofitting LED lighting across the Navy’s
fleet.
5. Discussion
5.1. Justification processes matter
We  started this paper with the question, “How do  complex orga-
nizations make decisions about adopting energy innovations?” Our
multi-case analysis documents that justification processes are a
part of such decision-making. LED lighting proponents in the Navy
went through multiple attempts to justify adopting LED lighting.
Thus, despite what some energy policy researchers might prioritize,
our data suggests that the community of practitioners actually treat
justifications as important decision-making factors, and they go to
great lengths to  develop suitable ones. This insight aligns with the
observation that, “[S]ome critiques suggest that a  large gap exists
between what energy policy researchers think is important, and
what business persons, utility commissioners, and policymakers
actually think and do.” ([9]; p.8). Rather than behaving as armchair
cost-benefit analyzers, organizational actors in the Navy made deci-
sions about LED lighting by  searching for ways to  justify changing
the Navy’s energy behaviors. We  have conceptualized this search
as a socio-political process in which organizational actors look for
ways to satisfy questions about “Why should we  do this?” that
are inevitably asked given other claims on an organization’s scarce
resources. We  suggest that the Navy needed to  generate a suit-
able justification for adopting LED lighting because a  broad range
of Navy stakeholders have to be convinced that investments of
capital, attention and enthusiasm into LED lighting are warranted.
Therefore, it is plausible to suppose that the lethargic adoption of
LED lighting in the Navy is in  part attributable to  the absence of a
compelling justification for adoption.
The case data shows that Navy proponents of LED lighting strug-
gled to articulate a  good justification for implementing LED lighting
across the fleet. None of the four justifications were especially
satisfactory. The two broad justifications for the adoption of LED
lighting to support strategic and operational objectives (the GGF
and combat effectiveness) lacked plausible storylines that linked
LED lighting effectively to these issues [30,51]. Therefore they did
not gain sufficient currency with the Navy’s stakeholders either
internally or in  Congress. The two financial justifications (main-
tenance burden and energy efficiency) diverged in their results.
The maintenance burden justification was not supported inside the
Navy because it assigned an opportunity cost of zero to ships’ labor.
Absent this decision, the logic of a  lower maintenance burden was
a justification that made sense for the Navy’s long-term strategy of
reducing manning on its warships. But given an opportunity cost of
zero on ships’ labor, the justification was not  plausible and senior
Navy officials discarded it. The energy efficiency justification was
the last justification remaining. Within the Navy, this justification
has proven, to  date, to be only marginally successful. Its chief weak-
ness is that a cost-benefit calculus is not the only element the Navy
considers in justifying the adoption of a new technology. There-
fore energy efficiency was a plausible but not  an especially strong
justification for adopting LED lighting. It was, however, the only
justification left.
5.2. The Navy’s energy culture
Our literature review highlights that justification processes
take place against the background of the prevailing organizational
energy culture [18,6]. This suggests that  the goodness of a  justi-
fication is contingent on organizational context. In Figs. 1 and 2
we highlight the external and internal influences (respectively) on
LED adoption in the Navy, expressed in terms of the energy cultures
framework.
The Department of Defense’s energy culture has been described
as one that considers energy cheap and abundant ([52]; p. 21).
The Navy has its own energy culture that is consistent with this
description but it differs from the Department of Defense and
from the other military services (the Army, Air Force and Marine
Corps) because it reflects the Navy’s specific history, from which the
Navy derives its specific professional norms, long-institutionalized
practices and idiosyncratic material culture. Fig. 2 represents the
collective role that specific elements of Navy norms, practices and
material culture have contributed in producing the Navy’s energy
culture.
Above all other descriptors, “inattentive” perhaps best sum-
marizes the Navy’s energy culture writ large [17]. As an entity,
the Navy has developed a culture in which, as much as possible,
energy issues are deliberately backgrounded. Several factors drive
this effect (three of which appear in Fig. 2). First is the intense
prioritization of mission accomplishment. Navy personnel work in
environments that have the potential to  become among the most
atavistic. At all levels of the Navy, it is a  strong professional norm
that the warfighting mission must get accomplished despite these
conditions. This warfighting mission sets the context for the Navy’s
energy culture. Concerns about energy use are pushed well down
among Navy’s priorities. Second, the Navy has removed energy con-
cerns in two  ways: specialization and nuclearization. The Navy’s
practice is  to  have its oil-based energy needs supported by  its cadre
of professional energy logisticians and engineering staff. Within
these specific parts of the Navy energy is an important consider-
ation that  is  allocated to them precisely so that  the warfighting
officers and sailors don’t have to attend to it. Thus, the division
of labor into specialties partly explains the general energy culture
of the Navy, which is to  have warfighters ignore energy by  deliber-
ately designing it to be a  specialty problem attended by  subordinate
commands. The nuclearization of a  significant portion of the Navy’s
fleet (10+ aircraft carriers and 30+ submarines) has the same effect
for the warfighters in  these vessels. In fact,  one of the reasons that
the Navy developed nuclear power was to  remove energy consider-
ations from the warfighter’s calculus. Thus, the material culture of
the Navy is greatly influenced by the characteristics of its key equip-
ment, nuclear-powered vessels. Finally, unlike the Marine Corps
and Army, the Navy has not faced operational energy limitations
since at least World War  II. Even during that war, the Japanese sur-
prise attack on Pearl Harbor failed to destroy the Navy’s massive
fuel oil reserve on the island. The absence of energy as an important
challenge for at least seven decades has helped shape the broader
Navy energy culture into one that – to  a  significant extent –  ignores
energy.1
This has meant that promoters of LED lighting in  the Navy have
had to face a skeptical Navy bureaucracy (and a skeptical Congress)
entrenched in a  culture that is unsympathetic to the value of energy
1 Readers will notice a  similarity here to  the notion of rational inattentiveness
[16].  In the case of the Navy there are  multiple drivers of inattention based in
norms,  practices and material culture rather than rational choice. The concept of
inattentiveness we describe is  closer to Ocasio’s [17]  arguments that organizational
behavior is  rooted in the limited attentional capacity of decision makers, a  product
of  bounded rationality.
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Fig. 1. External influences on  U.S. Navy energy culture.
Fig 2. Internal elements of U.S. Navy energy culture.
savings to the Navy. In the context of this prevailing culture, it is
challenging to support energy efficiency justifications. A good justi-
fication would need to resonate strongly with the Navy’s prevailing
energy culture and it would fit the organization’s energy norms:
the experiences, values, beliefs and worldviews of actors [66,6].
A resonant justification may  be successful, in part, because it is
noncontroversial and, therefore, “safe” to  implement ([14]; Irwin &
Davis, 1995). Therefore, if the Navy’s energy culture does not value
energy savings, it  severely limits the opportunity to  craft a resonant
justification for LED adoption.
5.3. Alternative explanations of the case data
We  view that energy technology adoption as being a  com-
plex phenomenon that  invites many alternative explanations [19].
Throughout our study, we considered alternative explanations for
our data. In particular, we sought to  understand why previous liter-
ature does not adequately explain our findings, hoping that it would
clarify what influences organizational decision-making regarding
energy innovations. The literature offers many explanations for the
sluggish adoption of alternative energy technologies [67,4].  We
considered no less than eight alternative explanations from the
economics and behavioral economics literatures, summarized in
Table 2.
After carefully considering each alternative in  Table 2,  we con-
clude that none of them offer a  more plausible explanation than our
suggestion: the Navy’s adoption of LED lighting has been limited by
the difficulty of crafting a  good justification for adoption, one that
has a  favorable fit with the prevailing energy culture.
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Table 2
Evidence supporting (S)  or refuting (R) alternative explanations for slow adoption.
Alternative explanation Evidence Support or Refute
Technical constraints Proposed LED lighting were drop-in replacement items that met  the Navy’s stringent
specifications. Technical constraints were not a  factor impeding adoption.
R
Weak incentives NAVSEA engineering community was  motivated to adopt LED lighting because of operational
benefits. Weak incentives were possible, because of perceived small impact and Navy’s
bureaucratic structure.
S/R
Alternative priorities LED lighting was  budgeted in FY13 through 17 under the category of “maritime quick wins”,
suggesting that the Navy had prioritized this item for rapid adoption.
R
Rational inattentiveness Rational inattentiveness [16] suggests that LED lighting would be screened out  because of small
impact.  However, Navy R&D support for shipboard LED lighting suggests significant Navy
attention to  this issue.
R
Informational deficiencies There is considerable engineering capacity in the  Navy, including very well informed,
professionally qualified subject-matter experts who have been pursuing shipboard LED lighting
initiatives for over a decade.
R
Capital constraints The Navy was not  operating under significant capital constraints, owing to continuous war  since
2001.
R
Risk  averseness The Navy has actively shouldered R&D risk in LED lighting. In 2002, the Office of Naval Research
invested in a  Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) project on  LEDs. Moreover, the
Navy has a long history of pioneering risky new technologies, such  as nuclear-powered ships.
R
Status quo bias NAVSEA engineers indicated strong preference for removing legacy lighting systems from Navy
ships, owing to  maintenance and HAZMAT handling.
R
6. Conclusion
The energy policy literature has sometimes assumed that  orga-
nizations make choices about adopting new energy technologies as
if they directly weigh the costs and benefits associated with those
technologies. However, our analysis of the U.S. Navy’s efforts to
adopt LED lighting suggests that organizational actors may  find it
more intuitive to evaluate the quality of justifications for adopting
new technologies. Justification quality may  be defined in various
ways, for example: by  the reasons and rationales that are most
appealing and convincing [14]; by  what is non-controversial (Irwin
and Davis, 1995); or by  what takes the least effort to justify [15].
Thus, while a favored justification may  sometimes correspond with
the balance of costs and benefits provided by a  technology, it also
reflects the social and political context of an organization and the
nature of the pluralistic competitive marketplace for ideas within
it [30].
In this paper, we have proposed that favored justifications are
likely to be those that resonate strongly with the prevailing energy
culture (norms, practices and material culture) of an organization.
However, in some energy cultures, opportunities for good justifi-
cations may  prove hard to develop – which has been the case for
LED lighting in the U.S. Navy. Because a good justification is  neces-
sary to move an organization to action, the non-availability of one
may  delay, limit or block the adoption of a  new energy technology.
Thus, our observations support a  pattern by now well established
in the energy policy literature: even when new energy technolo-
gies have promising economic or operational benefits supporting
their adoption, they may  face sluggish adoption or entirely fail  to
be adopted because factors beyond engineering and economics are
also pertinent [9].
To what extent is it possible to generalize our findings from
the Navy case, and therefore potentially address the broader policy
concerns that this study highlights? Certainly, the U.S.  Navy is not a
typical organization, and this invites questions about the boundary
conditions of the study that might be thought to  limit the general-
izability of the findings. Yet one of the chief purposes of case study
research (such as this one) is to develop concepts by  studying one
or more cases in depth. The concepts may  then be applied more
generally [13]. The U.S. Navy case has the advantage that much of
the data on the justification process is publicly available (whereas it
usually is not for private organizations) and it provides a categorical
example of the phenomenon of interest (another noted strength of
case research). Moreover, the underlying theoretical frameworks
on which we base this study– energy cultures and social account-
ability – are highly generalizable to other organizations. Therefore,
though we are cautious about generalizing from the Navy’s spe-
cific experience, we believe that the concept of justifications can
be  generalized to  a  wide range of organizations. This invites policy
recommendations, as follows.
Our study implies that  organizations do  not adopt energy inno-
vations using analyses focused on just costs and benefits. The
assumption that they do  might lead to distorted policy recommen-
dations because a focus on costs and benefits underestimates the
friction and dynamics of organizational decision-making processes.
There are times when being descriptively accurate and realistic
about decision processes inside organizations might be  important
[7,9].  While policy makers cannot change these organizational pro-
cesses, three recommendations follow.
First, a  better appreciation of organizational decision-making
processes would allow policy makers to more accurately predict
the results of energy policies. Policy makers would be aware that,
from an organizational perspective, new technologies offer oppor-
tunities whose timing depends on if and when a  good justification
comes along for adopting them. The coupling of new technologies
with good justifications may  resemble a  “garbage can process” [68]
that injects a  significant degree of contingency and unpredictability
into the timing of adoption [69].
Second, policy makers might want to revisit the trade-offs
between mandated adoption and voluntary adoption of  some
technologies [2].  Based on  our findings, existing debates on the
advantages and disadvantages of each approach may  result in  a
policy preference for market-based solutions (compared to man-
dated adoption) than is warranted, once the costs of organizational
decision processes are considered.
Third, rules and regulations that make justification processes
easier for organizations are likely to  result in  faster and wider
adoption of new energy technologies. They increase the external,
institutional influences on justification processes in organizations
[70].  The promotion of industry-wide standards, best practices
and best available technologies are three examples of institutional
forces that may  simplify the work of justifying choices inside orga-
nizations.
To conclude, Amory Lovins, who has consulted on numerous
projects for the U.S. Department of Defense, likes to say that it
doesn’t matter what justification is  used for adopting new energy
technologies because we might be able to  implement a  new tech-
nology regardless of why we  say we are doing it ([71]; p.146). Our
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study suggests this may  not be the case. Justifications, culture, and
their fit do matter.
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